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Abstract 
 
When participants take part in mental imagery experiments, are they using their 
"tacit knowledge" of perception to mimic what they believe should occur in the 
corresponding  perceptual  task?  Two  experiments  were  conducted  to  examine 
whether  such  an  account  can  be  applied  to  mental  imagery  in  general. These 
experiments both examined tasks that required participants to "mentally rotate" 
stimuli. In Experiment 1, instructions led participants to believe that they could 
re-orient shapes in one step or avoid re-orienting the shapes altogether. Regardless 
of  instruction  type,  response  times  increased  linearly  with  increasing  rotation 
angles.  In  Experiment  2,  participants  first  observed  novel  objects  rotating  at 
different speeds, and then performed a mental rotation task with those objects. 
The speed of perceptually demonstrated rotation did not affect the speed of mental 
rotation. We argue that tacit knowledge cannot explain mental imagery results in 
general, and that in particular the mental rotation effect reflects the nature of the 
underlying  internal  representation  and  processes  that  transform  it,  rather  than 
participants’ pre-existing knowledge. 
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An enormous amount of research followed Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) 
seminal  article  on  mental  rotation.  In  Shepard  and  Metzler’s  paradigm, 
participants are asked to view three-dimensional objects that have several arms, 
each consisting of small cubes. The task is to decide whether two such objects 
have the same shape, regardless of a difference in orientation. The key finding 
was that response times (RTs) increased linearly with increasing angular disparity 
between the two objects. Shepard and Metzler interpreted this finding as showing 
that people mentally rotate one of the objects to align it to the orientation of the 
other object. Subsequent studies showed that the mental rotation effect was not 
limited to abstract geometric shapes. The linear increase in RTs has been found in 
studies  using  alphanumeric  stimuli  (e.g.,  Cooper  &  Shepard,  1973,  Koriat  & 
Norman,  1985),  two-dimensional  line  drawings  of  letter-like  asymmetrical 
characters  (e.g.,  Tarr  &  Pinker,  1989),  and  pictures  of  common  objects  (e.g., 
Jolicoeur, 1985).  
Many  researchers  have  interpreted  the  mental  rotation  effect  (i.e.,  the 
linear increase in RTs with an increasing angle between objects) as showing that 
an internal representation is structurally analogous to a visual percept, and this 
representation is manipulated in a way that emulates the corresponding physical 
transformation. This interpretation in turn suggests that one purpose of imagery is 
to simulate the world to extract previously unnoticed information, for example  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.4 
 
that two shapes in different orientations are in fact identical (Shepard & Cooper, 
1982; see also Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis; Thompson, Kosslyn, Hoffman & 
van der Kooij, 2008).  
However,  Pylyshyn  (1981,  2002,  2007)  has  argued  that  many  classic 
mental imagery findings do not reflect properties of the underlying representation. 
Instead,  he  claims  that  the  results  occur  because  participants  use  their  beliefs 
(based on  experience) to predict or mimic what would happen in a particular 
situation. According to Pylyshyn, findings in mental imagery studies often reveal 
nothing about the properties of the underlying representations because they are a 
byproduct of participants’ tacit knowledge. A corollary of this position is that 
unless proven otherwise, mental imagery data should be interpreted as revealing 
tacit knowledge, which in turn alters processing (and hence such processing is 
said to be "cognitively penetrable. Thus, in order to conclude that a given result 
reflects characteristics of the manner in which an internal representation has been 
processed,  one  must  demonstrate  that  different  beliefs  do  not  yield  different 
results. Moreover, as Pylyshyn (2007) has emphasized, one should not attempt to 
introduce  such  beliefs  by  inducing  “strange  expectancies  by  telling  unrealistic 
stories about object movements” (p. 134) to the participants.  
To  be  clear:  we  do  not  claim  that  Pylyshyn  has  attributed  all  mental 
rotation effects to tacit knowledge. In fact, he has shown that mental rotation 
slopes  can  be  influenced  by  task  and  stimulus  parameters  (such  as  practice,  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.5 
 
complexity  and  “goodness  of  fit”  of  the  original  stimuli  with  the  comparison 
stimuli; Pylyshyn, 1979), and interpreted this finding as demonstrating that mental 
rotation  is  accomplished  in  a  piecemeal,  analytic  fashion,  rather  than  as  the 
rotation  of  an  analog  representation.  But  our  goal  is  not  to  test  specifically 
Pylyshyn’s  views  of  mental  imagery  or  mental  rotation.  The  general  issue  of 
cognitive penetrability -- that is, whether one’s beliefs about mental events can 
influence how one performs a task -- is important in its own right. If one’s beliefs 
about a task can influence how it is performed, data from the task need not reflect 
characteristics of the underlying representations or processes. If, however, one’s 
beliefs (implicit or explicit) do not affect task performance (e.g., by altering the 
linear increase in time to rotate farther distances during mental rotation), then this 
is good evidence that performance characteristics do reflect characteristics of the 
underlying representations and processes.  
In the experiments reported here, we investigated whether tacit knowledge 
can  account  for  the  linear  relationship  between  RTs  and  angular  disparity  in 
mental  rotation  tasks.  We  made  two  strong  predictions:  First,  if  the  linear 
relationship between the response time and angular disparity is a consequence of 
the  nature  of  the  underlying  representation  and  process,  then  participants’ 
expectancies and knowledge about the experimental situation should not alter this 
relationship. Second, if mental rotation results reflect the inherent nature of the 
representation and process, then participants' expectancies and knowledge should  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.6 
 
not alter the speed at which they mentally rotate. These predicted null effects 
should  persist  in  the  face  of  the  usual  positive  effects,  specifically  the  tight 
relationship between response time and angular distance of rotation.  
 
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to compare the effect of three types of 
instructions on two classic mental rotation tasks. One of the tasks required the 
participants  to  compare  three-dimensional  objects  adapted  from  Shepard  and 
Metzler’s paradigm (1971, hereafter referred to as the "SM task"), and one of the 
tasks required them to classify misoriented alphanumeric characters adapted from 
Cooper and Shepard’s paradigm (1973, hereafter referred to as the "CS task"). 
Participants in different conditions received different sets of realistic instructions, 
a  method  proposed  by  Pylyshyn  (1981)  as  a  way  to  test  the  tacit  knowledge 
account of mental imagery processes. The different instructions were partly based 
upon strategies identified by Geiser, Lehmann, and Eid (2006) in a sample of 
1,695 participants who performed the 24 items of the Mental Rotation Test (MRT, 
Vandenberg & Kuse, 1978).  
Specifically, we asked participants to use one of three different strategies 
to perform the tasks: a mental rotation strategy, a leap strategy, or an analytic 
strategy. In the mental rotation condition, we asked participants to mentally rotate 
the object on the right side of the screen from its original orientation to the same  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.7 
 
orientation as the object on the left (SM task), or to rotate the letter or digit to its 
upright orientation (CS task), and then to make the appropriate judgment. In the 
leap condition, we asked participants to imagine the object jumping, quickly and 
in a single leap, from its original orientation to the orientation of the object on the 
left (SM task), or to the upright orientation (CS task), without visualizing the 
intermediate steps (as if the transformation were instantaneous). In the analytic 
condition, we asked participants to compare the segments of the object on the 
right with the segments of the object on the left (SM task), or to compare the 
segments of the characters with those in a normal character (CS task), to decide 
whether they fit together in the same way. The analytic condition we designed is 
distinct from the strategy identified by Just and Carpenter (1976), where people 
rotate one segment at a time and then compare how the segments fit together. The 
analytic  condition  we  used  resembles  a  strategy  proposed  by  Cooper  (1976), 
where participants use reasoning to evaluate the stimuli. Moreover, in the leap and 
the  analytic  conditions,  participants  were  explicitly  instructed  not  to  mentally 
rotate the objects or the characters.  
If the usual instructions lead participants to use their beliefs of how things 
unfold in the real world to mimic what would happen when they imagine these 
situations, then we would not expect a linear relationship between the RTs and the 
angular disparity of the stimuli in both the leap and the analytical conditions. In 
fact, if the leap and analytic strategies are effective for performing the tasks, the  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.8 
 
angular disparity of the objects should have no effect on the time required to 
perform the judgment. On the other hand, if mental rotation occurs because of the 
structure  of  the  internal  representations  and  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
processed in order to perform the tasks, then RTs should increase as more rotation 
is required regardless of type of instructions. In addition, the rotation rate (as 
revealed by the slopes of the best-fitting lines), the efficiency of the cognitive 
process (as revealed by the error rates), and the height of the intercepts should be 
similar  in  the  three  groups  of  participants  if  similar  cognitive  processes  and 
representations are being used. 
 
Method 
Participants 
  Seventy-two volunteers from Harvard University and the local community 
participated in this study (44 females and 28 males, mean age 22 years and 4 
months). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three groups (mental 
rotation, leap, analytic); 68 participants were right- handed, 4 left-handed, and all 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Data from 3 participants were not 
analyzed because they failed to reach a performance threshold on at least one of 
the tasks. All the participants provided written consent and received either $10 or 
class  credit for their participation. Participants were tested in accordance with 
national  and  international  norms  governing  the  use  of  human  research  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.9 
 
participants. The study was approved by the Harvard University Faculty of Arts 
and Sciences Committee on the Use of Human Subjects. 
 
Materials 
For the SM task, we created 12 three-dimensional arm-like objects formed by 
small cubes. All objects consisted of four arms created by connecting 7 to 11 
white cubes "(For details on how the stimuli were created, see Wright et al., 
2008.)" 
As shown in Figure 1, we created a stimulus by placing two objects on a 28 cm x 
14.5 cm black rectangle (26.2° x 13.7° visual angle). The centroid (i.e., the point 
that was on average closest to all other points of an object) of each object was 
placed 6 cm (5.7° visual angle) to the right or to the left of the center of the black 
rectangle. Each stimulus was displayed in the center of the screen. The object on 
the right was either the same as the object on the left or it was a mirror reflection 
(through  the  y-axis).  The  object  on  the  right  could  be  either  in  the  same 
orientation as the one on the left or rotated by 50, 100, or 150 degrees around the 
y-axis (see Figure 1).  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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For  the  CS  task,  we  designed  12  non-symmetrical  alphanumeric 
characters:  three  uppercase  letters  (G,  J,  R),  three  numbers  (2,  5,  7),  and  six 
mirror-images of those characters. All were shown in black using a 72-point Arial 
font (extending over 7.62 cm, subtending 7.3° visual angle) and placed in the 
center of a 17.5 cm (16.6° visual angle) diameter circle (see Figure 2). All 12 
characters could be presented at one of six possible orientations (from 0 to 300 
degrees with 60 degree intervals). 
We presented the stimuli on a 17 in iMac G5 with resolution of 1,680 x 
1050 pixels and a refresh rate of 75 Hz. The tasks were implemented using 
PsyScope software running in Macintosh OS X.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Procedure 
The  participants  were  tested  individually,  sitting  approximately  60  cm 
from  a  computer  screen.  We  assigned  each  participant  to  one  of  the  three 
conditions, and all participants performed both the SM and the CS tasks. The 
order  of  the  two  tasks  was  fully  counterbalanced  over  participants  in  each 
condition. Each group received a different set of instructions (i.e., mental rotation, 
leap,  or  analytic).  In  each  task,  we  first  showed  the  participants  written  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.11 
 
instructions (see Appendix for the text of the instructions). Following this, we 
presented an example of a trial and the way the instructions should be followed. 
Finally, we asked participants to paraphrase the instructions to ensure that they 
understood how they should perform the tasks. We administered this procedure at 
the beginning of each of the two tasks.  
Each  trial  started  with  a  250  ms  blank  screen,  after  which  one  of  the 
stimuli was presented until participants responded by pressing one of two buttons 
within  a  time  limit  of  7500  ms.  Participants  were  instructed  to  make  their 
judgments as quickly and accurately as possible, using the specific instructions 
they were given at the beginning of the task. In the SM task, participants were to 
decide whether or not the two objects were identical, and in the CS task they were 
to  decide  whether  the  character  was  in  its  standard  form  or  mirror-reversed. 
Participants used their dominant hand to respond, pressing the “b” key if they 
decided that the objects in a pair had the same shape (SM task) or if the character 
was in its standard form (CS task); if they decided that the objects were different 
or the character was mirror reversed, they pressed the “n” key. The onset of a 
stimulus started a timer, which was stopped when either of the two response keys 
was pressed.  
In each of the tasks, participants performed two blocks of 48 trials, for a 
total of 96 trials. In each block, the six possible orientations in the CS task (four 
orientations  in  the  SM  task)  occurred  equally  often.  On  half  of  the  trials  the  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.12 
 
objects in a pair had the same shape (SM task) or the character was in its standard 
form (CS task). The order of the trials was random, except that no more than three 
same or different (standard or mirror-image) trials occurred consecutively. In each 
task, before the first experimental trial, participants performed 12 practice trials 
where the computer provided feedback on their answer.            
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), the Object Spatial Imagery Questionnaire 
(OSIQ,  Blajenkova,  Kozhevnikov,  &  Motes,  2006),  the  Subjective  Use  of 
Imagery  Scale  (SUIS,  Kosslyn  laboratory,  in  development),  the  Vividness  of 
Visual  Imagery  Questionnaire  (VVIQ,  Marks,  1973),  and  a  debriefing 
questionnaire to ensure that they did not infer the purpose of the experiment and 
that they followed the instructions.  
 
Results 
All analyses of RTs included only data from trials on which participants 
provided the correct answer. As is standard practice in studies of mental rotation, 
we only analyzed data from trials in which the two shapes matched (SM task) or 
where the character was in its normal form (CS task). This convention has been 
adopted because the angle through which the “different” shapes must be rotated to 
attempt to achieve congruence in the SM task is not strictly defined; the same 
logic applied for the character stimuli in the CS task. Outliers were defined as  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.13 
 
RTs  greater  than  2  standard  deviations  from  the  mean  of  that  angle  for  that 
participant. Outliers occurred on 1.8% of the trials. After removing outliers, for 
each participant, the average RT for each angle of rotation in each of the two tasks 
was computed.  
As a first step, we analyzed the data from each of the three groups in each 
task  separately  to  determine  (1)  whether  RTs  differed  significantly  for  the 
different angles, and (2) whether RTs increased linearly with increasing angles in 
all  groups.  Following  this,  we  conducted  a  three-way  analysis  of  variance 
(ANOVA) to investigate whether there was an interaction between the type of 
instruction, the type of task, and angular disparity. Finally, we compared the error 
rates (ERs), the steepness of the slopes of the best-fitting lines, and the heights of 
the intercepts of the best-fitting lines (i.e. the RTs for the 0 degree orientation) for 
all three groups in each of the two mental rotation tasks. In addition, for each of 
the analyses, we report the effect size of the ANOVA (partial eta squared) or of 
the difference of the means (Cohen’s d). 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effect of gender or of task order on any 
of  the  dependent  variables.  Thus,  we  pooled  the  data  over  these  variables. 
Moreover, scores on the three subscales (verbal, spatial and object) of the OSIQ, 
scores on the VVIQ, and scores on the SUIS did not differ significantly among 
the  three  instruction-set  groups.  Finally,  the  analysis  of  the  debriefing  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.14 
 
questionnaire  revealed  that  all  participants  whose  data  were  included  in  the 
analyses reported carefully following the instructions. 
 
Effects of angle 
  SM  task.  A  one-way  repeated  measures  ANOVA  confirmed  that  RTs 
varied for different angular disparities between the shapes in all three groups, with 
F(3, 69) = 65.92, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .74, for the mental rotation group, F(3, 69) = 
63.32, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .74, for the leap group, and F(3, 69) = 74.84, p < .0001, 
ηp
2 = .77 for the analytic group. As shown in Figure 3, RTs increased linearly 
with increasing angular disparity between the two objects, in the mental rotation 
group [F(1, 23) = 187.49, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .73], in the leap group [F(1, 23) = 
182.27, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .73], and in the analytic group [F(1, 23) = 215.87, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .76]. The quadratic trend in the angular disparity effect was also 
significant, with respectively, F(1, 23) = 9.37, p < .01, ηp
2 = .12, for the mental 
rotation group; F(1, 23) = 7.79, p < .025, ηp
2 = .10, for the leap group; F(1, 23) = 
8.69, p < .01, ηp
2 = .11, for the analytic group. However, the linear trend in the 
effect  of  angular  disparity  between  objects  accounted  for  between  94.8%  and 
96.1% of the variance due to orientation in the three groups.  
  In addition, for each of the three groups, we computed the best-fitting 
linear  functions  calculated  by  the  method  of  least  squares.  RTs  and  angular 
disparity between objects were highly correlated (with Bravais-Pearson rs ranging  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.15 
 
from .97 to .98, p < .05 in all groups). These results replicate earlier findings 
(Shepard  &  Metzler,  1971)  and  suggest  that  participants  mentally  rotated  the 
object on the right to achieve congruence before judging whether the two objects 
had the same shape, regardless of the type of instructions participants were given. 
In fact the coefficient of correlations between RTs and angular disparity did not 
differ among the three groups, p > .25 in all cases. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
  CS  task.  Again,  one-way  repeated  measures  ANOVAs  revealed  a 
significant effect of the magnitude of angle on the time to decide whether the 
character was presented in its standard form. This finding characterized all three 
groups of participants: in the mental rotation group, F(3, 69) = 50.75, p < .0001, 
ηp
2 = .69; in the leap group, F(3, 69) = 48.64, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .68; and in the 
analytic group, F(3, 69) = 58.14, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .72 . Moreover, RTs increased 
linearly with increasing rotation of the character from its upright position for each 
group, with F(1, 23) = 137.18, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .67, for the mental rotation group; 
F(1, 23) = 130.6, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .65, for the leap group; F(1, 23) = 157.39, p < 
.0001, ηp
2 = .70, for the analytic group. Although the trend analysis revealed a 
significant quadratic component in the mental rotation group [F(1, 23) = 12.88, p  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.16 
 
< .005, ηp
2 = .16], in the leap group  [F(1, 23) = 13.79, p < .005, ηp
2 = .17], and in 
the  analytic  group  [F(1,  23)  =  16.73,  p  <  .001,  ηp
2  =  .20], the  proportion  of 
variance accounted for by the linear trend ranged from 89.5% to 90.1% in the 
three groups of participants. 
  In addition, as shown in Figure 4, RTs were highly correlated with the 
angular distance of rotation for all three groups (Bravais-Pearson rs ranging from 
.95 to .96, p < .05). The results demonstrated that participants mentally rotated the 
character from the orientation in which it was presented to its upright orientation, 
as reported by Cooper and Shepard (1973). Furthermore, the type of instructions 
given to the participants did not affect the relationship between the RTs and the 
degree of rotation of the characters, p > .25. 
Finally, a three-way ANOVA (Instructions x Task x Angle) provided no 
evidence that the effect of the angular disparity varied for the two tasks or the 
type of instructions, F(6, 207) < 1, NS, ηp
2 < .01. In each of the two tasks, two-
way  ANOVAs  confirmed  that  the  magnitude  of  the  angular  rotation  was  not 
affected by the type of instructions, with all F values < 1, NS, ηp
2 < .01. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
ER, slopes and intercepts  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.17 
 
  ERs. ERs were consistent for the three instructions and the type of task, F 
< 1, NS, ηp
2 < .01, for the interaction between the two variables. In addition, 
participants made comparable numbers of errors in all three groups in each of the 
two tasks. In the SM task, the average ERs did not differ between the mental 
rotation group (M = 11.8%), the leap group (M = 12.5%), and the analytic group 
(M = 13.1%), all ts < 1, NS, ds < .37 (see Table 1). Similarly, in the CS task, 
participants made comparable numbers of errors in the mental rotation group (M 
= 4.8%), the leap group (M = 5.2%), and the analytic group (M = 4.4%), ts < 1, 
NS, ds < .62. Finally, participants made more errors in the SM task (M = 12.5%) 
than in the CS task (M = 4.8%), t(71) = 6.68, p < .0001, d = 1.01, which is 
consistent with differences in accuracies previously documented between two- 
dimensional and three-dimensional object rotation (e.g., Carpenter & Just, 1978; 
Shepard & Metzler, 1988). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
  Slopes. For each participant, we computed the slope of the best fitting 
lines and then averaged the individual slopes over the participants in each group 
(see Table 1). A two-way ANOVA (Task x Instructions) on the average slopes of 
the best-fitting lines revealed no interaction between these two variables, F < 1,  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.18 
 
NS, ηp
2 = .001. Two one-way ANOVAs (one for each of the tasks) revealed no 
effect of the type of instructions on the average speed with which participants 
mentally rotated the stimuli (reflected by the steepness of the slopes of the best 
fitting lines), with F < 1, NS, ηp
2 = .009, in the SM task and F(2, 69) = 1.25, p > 
.25, ηp
2 = .04, in the CS task. In addition, in the SM task, the steepness of the 
slopes was comparable in the mental rotation group (M = 12.4 ms/degree), the 
leap group (M = 11.5 ms/degree) and the analytic group (M = 12.8 ms/degree), all 
ts < 1, NS, ds < .23. The same was true in the CS task; for the mental rotation 
group (M = 4.1 ms/degree) versus the leap group (M = 3.3 ms/degree), t(46) = 
1.31, p > .15, d = .38 ; for the mental rotation group versus the analytic group (M 
= 4.2 ms/degree), t < 1, d = .03 ; and for the leap group versus the analytic group, 
t(46) = 1.47, p > .1, d = .42. 
On  their  face,  the  results  of  these  analyses  appear  to  support  the  null 
hypothesis, which posits no difference between the average slopes between the 
groups. However, as always, it is difficult to affirm that no difference exists: we 
risk a type-II error if we lack statistical power. Thus, we conducted a post-hoc 
power  analysis  using  G*Power  (Faul,  Erdfelder,  Lang,  &  Buchner,  2007)  to 
determine the probability of a type-II error given our sample size (n = 72) in each 
task. If we assume that tacit knowledge is at work, the crucial prediction is that 
the slopes in the two non-mental rotation groups (i.e., leap and analytic) should be 
flat  (or  at  least  not  significantly  different  from  0  ms/degree),  and  should  be  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.19 
 
significantly lower than in the mental rotation group. In order to estimate the 
effect  size  for  the  power  analysis,  we  began  by  computing  both  the  99% 
confidence intervals (CI) in the leap and the analytic groups for an average slope 
of 0 ms/degree and the standard deviations based on the largest value observed in 
the three groups (SD = 5.73; CI = -3.1 ms/degree to 3.1 ms/degree in the SM task 
and  SD  =  2.33;  CI  =  -1.2  ms/degree  to  1.2  ms/degree  in  the  CS  task);  we 
computed the same for the mental rotation group (CI = 9.5 ms/degree to 15.5 
ms/degree in the SM task and CI = 2.9 ms/degree to 5.3 ms/degree in the CS 
task). Then, based on those average slopes, we estimated the effect size (d = 1.11 
in the SM task and d = .78 in the CS task). For a criterion of significance set at .05 
with a two-tailed t-test, the probability of a type-II error was low in the SM task 
(β = 3.6 %) but relatively high in the CS task (β = 24.6 %).  
  Finally, consistent with previous findings (e.g. Carpenter & Just, 1978; 
Shepard & Metzler, 1988), participants mentally rotated the characters (M = 3.9 
ms/degrees)  faster  than  the  three-dimensional  objects  (M  =  12.2  ms/degrees), 
t(71) = 13.34, p < .0001, d = 1.97.  
  Intercepts.  We used the mean RTs in the 0 degree orientation in both 
the  SM  and  the  CS  tasks  as  the  height  of  the  intercept  (see  Table  1)  in  the 
following analysis. The effect of the type of instructions and the types of tasks did 
not interact with the height of the intercepts, as revealed by a two-way ANOVA 
(Task  x  Instruction),  F(2,  69)  =  1.52,  p  >  .2,  ηp
2  =  .04.  One-way  ANOVAs  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.20 
 
revealed no effect of the type of instructions on the height of the intercepts in the 
SM task, F < 1, ηp
2 = .02, or in the CS task, F (2, 69) = 2.06, p > .1, ηp
2 = .06. In 
the SM task, the height of the intercepts did not differ between the mental rotation 
group (M = 1516 ms), the leap group (M = 1407 ms), and the analytic group (M = 
1395 ms), all t values < 1, ds < .24. Similarly, in the CS task, the mental rotation 
group (M = 822 ms) did not differ from the leap group (M = 814 ms), t < 1, d = 
.05, nor from the analytic group (M = 924 ms), t(46) = 1.64, p > .1, d = .47, and 
the leap group did not differ from the analytic group, t(46) = 1.63, p > .1, d = .48. 
As reported in the analysis of the ERs and the slopes, the height of the intercept 
was higher in the SM task (M = 1439 ms) than in the CS task (853 ms), t(71) = 
11.14, p < .0001, d = 1.62, in line with findings from Carpenter and Just (1978), 
and Shepard and Metzler (1988).   
 
Discussion 
When participants were required to judge whether two three-dimensional 
objects were identical (the SM task), they took more time as the angular disparity 
increased between the two objects. This finding was not affected in any respect by 
the instructions. Critically, the rate with which participants mentally rotated the 
objects (as revealed by the steepness of the slopes of the best fitting lines) was not 
affected  by  the  type  of  instructions  they  received.  Indeed,  the  three  types  of 
instructions led to comparable slopes, intercepts, and error rates.   Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.21 
 
These  results  suggest  that,  independently  of  the  type  of  instructions 
provided, participants imagined one of the objects rotating into congruence with 
the other in order to judge whether the two objects had the same shape. Given that 
participants in the leap group and in the analytic group were not instructed to 
visualize the object moving along a trajectory (in fact, in the leap condition they 
were specifically instructed to not imagine the intermediate positions), the strong 
linear increase in RTs with greater angular disparity observed in all three groups 
contradicts  explanations  based  on  the  tacit  knowledge  account  of  the  mental 
rotation effect. In addition, it is important to note that the finding of a significant 
linear relationship between RTs and the angular disparity in the leap and analytic 
groups, where we would not expect this pattern under the tacit knowledge account 
of  mental  rotation,  rules  out  any  concerns  that  our  analysis  lacked  statistical 
power.  
One  might  be  concerned  that  the  lack  of  an  effect  of  the  type  of 
instructions might be restricted to one type of task, one type of stimulus, or one 
type of rotation axis. We included two tasks in order to assuage such concerns. In 
fact,  in  our  study,  participants  mentally  rotated  unfamiliar  three-dimensional 
objects at a slower rate  and less efficiently than well known two-dimensional 
stimuli, which replicates previous findings (e.g., Carpenter & Just, 1978; Shepard 
& Metzler, 1988). By showing that participants' assumptions about the task do not 
account for the mental rotation effect in two mental rotation tasks that differ in  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.22 
 
speed and processing efficiency, which affect the characteristics of the cognitive 
process, we provide evidence that our findings are generalizable. 
In addition, one could argue that our manipulation of the instructions was 
not strong enough to alter the relationship between RTs and angular disparities. 
However, Pylyshyn (1981) and Kosslyn, Ball and Reiser (Experiment 3, 1978) 
demonstrated that the mental image scanning effect (i.e., linear increase in RTs 
with increasing distance scanned) was not observed when participants were not 
given instructions to scan. Thus, we are confident that the manipulation of the 
instructions  should  have  produced  different  RT  functions  if  tacit  knowledge 
accounts for the mental rotation effect. 
Finally, in the CS task, although not statistically significant, we did find a 
trend for smaller effects in the leap group, as predicted by the tacit knowledge 
account -- and the difference in rotation rate appeared to be greater than “small,” 
according to Cohen’s (1988) d benchmarks of effect size. The effect size may 
suggest that with a larger sample we might have found that participants were 
faster in the leap group than in the two other groups. In fact, the probability of 
committing  a  type  II-error  on  the  slopes  in  this  task  was  relatively  large. 
However, we did observe a linear increase of the RTs with increasing rotation in 
the leap group (as in the other two groups), which suggests that participants were 
mentally rotating the stimuli. On this basis, we argue that the trend reflects a 
tendency toward a speed/accuracy trade-off, given that participants in the leap  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.23 
 
group  tended  to  make  more  errors  than  in  the  two  other  groups.  There  is  no 
evidence that cognitive processes distinct from mental rotation were at play in the 
leap group. 
To examine more closely the cognitive penetrability of mental rotation, we 
conducted  an  additional  experiment.  Experiment  2  is  intended  to  manipulate 
directly the tacit knowledge of the participants about the speed of the rotation. By 
using a mixed design in this experiment, we also increased statistical power.   
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we used instructions in an attempt to discover whether 
mental rotation is cognitively penetrable. However, Pylyshyn (1981, 2003, 2007) 
has emphasized the effects of tacit knowledge per se in affecting performance. 
Thus, in this experiment we manipulated the participants' tacit knowledge of how 
quickly novel shapes rotate. By using novel objects, we attempt to create tacit 
knowledge of how these objects behave. After asking the participants to observe a 
movie  of  these  novel  shapes  rotating  (either  relatively  quickly  or  relatively 
slowly,  for  different  participants),  we  then  investigated  whether  differences  in 
such experience affect subsequent mental rotation of those objects.   
In  this  experiment,  participants  mentally  rotated  the  three-dimensional 
objects (see Figure 1) in the same way as in the mental rotation condition of the 
SM  task  in  Experiment  1.  They  performed  this  task  twice,  once  before  (as  a  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.24 
 
baseline) and once after a perceptual rotation task. In the perceptual rotation task, 
before each trial the participants saw a series of single objects completing a 360-
degree rotation either clockwise or counterclockwise around the y-axis. Prior to 
showing participants the rotating objects, we  explicitly instructed them to pay 
attention to the rotation rate of the objects because they would later need to mimic 
the rotation speed in a subsequent mental rotation task. To ensure that participants 
actually  watched  the  objects  rotating,  after  each  trial  they  were  to  indicate 
whether the rotation had been clockwise or counterclockwise. For one group of 
participants, the objects rotated approximately twice as quickly as the average 
rotation speed found in the SM task of Experiment 1. For the other group, the 
objects rotated approximately twice as slowly as the average rotation speed found 
in the SM task of Experiment 1. 
We reasoned that if participants use tacit knowledge of the way things 
unfold  in  the  real  world  to  mimic  what  would  happen  when  the  situation  is 
imagined, then the speed with which participants mentally rotate the objects (as 
revealed by the steepness of the slopes of the best-fitting lines) should be affected 
by the rotation rate of objects displayed visually. Thus, participants who observed 
these  novel  objects  rotating  quickly  prior  to  the  mental  rotation  task  should 
mentally rotate these objects faster than participants who observed the objects 
rotating slowly prior to the mental rotation task. Conversely, if mental rotation 
speed is a consequence of the way representations are processed, then we do not  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.25 
 
expect  an  effect  of  the  rotation  rate  of  the  visually  presented  objects  on 
subsequent performance of the task.   
However, we did expect participants to be generally faster in the second 
set of mental rotation trials than in the first set of trials because of practice effects. 
Thus,  the  information-processing  view  does  not  simply  predict  null  effects: 
Rather, we should find the heights of the intercepts of the best-fitting lines to be 
reduced, but the slopes of the best-fitting lines to remain the same.  
 
Method 
Participants 
  We  tested  24  volunteers  (14  females  and  10  males)  from  Harvard 
University  and  the  local  community  who  did  not  participate  in  the  previous 
experiment. One participant was left-handed and all others were right -handed. 
The average age of the participants was 22 years and 11 months. Participants 
received either $10 or class credit for their participation, and reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were randomly assigned to each of two 
groups (fast visual rotation task or slow visual rotation task). All the participants 
provided  written  consent  and  were  tested  in  accordance  with  national  and 
international norms governing the use of human research participants. The study 
was approved by the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Committee 
on the Use of Human Subjects.  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.26 
 
Materials 
For the mental rotation tasks, we created 24 three-dimensional arm-like 
objects  formed  by  small  cubes,  respecting  the  same  characteristics  as  those 
designed for the SM task in Experiment 1 (with same number of arms and white 
cubes, same  size, same position on the computer screen, same rotation of the 
object on the right around the y-axis). In addition, for the perceptual task, we 
designed 12 additional three-dimensional  objects, respecting the same constraints 
as the 24 stimuli designed for the mental rotation task. For each of these stimuli, 
we  created  two  animations,  which  varied  in  speed  (as  described  below)  that 
rotated  360  degrees  on  a  black  background.  Animations  were  640  x  480  .avi 
movies (30 frames per second).       
 
Procedure 
We tested the participants individually, with each sitting approximately 60 
cm  from  a  computer  screen.  We  divided  the  participants  into  groups  of  12 
participants, and assigned each group to one of the two conditions (fast visual 
rotation task or slow visual rotation task). In each group, participants performed a 
mental  rotation  task  (hereafter  referred  as  MR1),  then  a  visual  rotation  task 
(hereafter referred as VR), and finally a second mental rotation task (hereafter 
referred as MR2). We explicitly asked participants to pay attention to the speed 
with which the visually presented objects rotated. We told them that they would  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.27 
 
soon  be  asked  to  imagine  similar  objects  rotating  at  the  same  speed  in  a 
subsequent task (i.e., the MR2 task). Before starting the MR2 task, we asked the 
participants to mentally rotate the objects on the right in each pair at the speed 
with which the objects had rotated when they viewed them (i.e., during the VR 
task).    
In the mental rotation tasks, the procedure was identical to the one used in 
the SM task of Experiment 1. Each trial started with a 250 ms blank screen, then 
one of the stimuli was presented until participants responded by pressing one of 
two buttons, within a 7500 ms time limit. We asked participants to decide whether 
or not the two objects had the identical shape by mentally rotating the object on 
the  right  into  congruence  with  the  object  on  the  left.  Participants  used  their 
dominant hand to respond, using the  same response keys (“b”  and “n”) as in 
Experiment 1. The onset of a stimulus started a timer, which was stopped when 
either of the two response keys was pressed.  
In each mental rotation task (MR1 and MR2), participants performed two 
blocks of 48 trials, for a total of 96 trials per task. In each block, six objects were 
presented eight times, with the four orientations appearing equally often. On half 
of the trials the objects were the same shape; on half, they were mirror images. An 
object used in one block was never used in any of the other blocks. The four sets 
of objects in each of the blocks of the two tasks were fully counterbalanced over 
participants in each group. The order of the trials was random, except that no  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.28 
 
more  than  three  same  or  different  trials  occurred  consecutively  and  the  same 
object could not appear consecutively. In each mental rotation task, participants 
performed  12  practice  trials,  where  the  computer  provided  feedback  on  their 
answers, prior to the experimental trials.  
In the visual rotation task, after a 250 ms blank screen, an animation of 
one  of  the  12  objects  was  presented  in  the  center  of  the  screen.  Participants 
performed two blocks of 48 trials for a total of 96 trials. On half of the trials, 
objects  rotated  clockwise;  on  half,  they  rotated  counterclockwise.  Trials  were 
presented randomly except that no more than three rotations of the same direction 
and of the same object occurred consecutively. In the fast condition of the VR 
task, objects took 2 s to complete a full rotation (360 degrees), at a rotation speed 
of  5.5  ms/degree.  In  the  slow  condition  of  the  VR  task,  objects  took  8  s  to 
complete a full rotation, at a rotation speed of 22.2 ms/degree. After the object 
had fully rotated, the participants were to use their dominant hand to press the “b” 
key when the object had rotated clockwise or the “n” key when it had rotated 
counterclockwise.  We  asked  the  participants  to  delay  their  response  until  the 
object had finished its 360–degree rotation, which thus required the participants to 
watch the display. The response and the time taken to respond were recorded.  
At the end of the experiment, the participants completed the same paper-
and-pencil questionnaires as in Experiment 1. 
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Results 
As in Experiment 1, analyses of RTs in the mental rotation tasks included 
only data from trials where the two shapes matched and on which participants 
provided the correct answer. Outliers, defined as in Experiment 1, occurred on 
1.9% of the trials. After removing the outliers for each participant, the average RT 
for each angle of rotation in each of the two mental rotation tasks was computed.  
In the VR task, we limited our analysis to the accuracy of participants’ 
responses,  in  order  to  verify  that  participants  did  in  fact  pay  attention  to  the 
objects’  rotations.  In  both  conditions  of  the  VR  task,  the  participants  were 
extremely accurate when judging the direction of rotation (with fewer than 1% 
errors). Thus, we are confident that participants focused their attention on the 
rotations of the novel objects.  No further analyses of the VR task are provided in 
the subsequent analysis of the results. 
Our goal was to discover whether the rotation speed of an object presented 
perceptually affects the slope of the best-fitting lines in a mental rotation task. A 
prerequisite for this analysis is to ensure that mental rotation was used in the 
mental rotation tasks in each of the two groups. Thus, as a first step, we analyzed 
the mental rotation data from each of the two groups to determine whether RTs 
increased  linearly  with  increasing  angle.  Following  this,  we  conducted  a 
systematic comparison of the ERs, the steepness of the slopes of the best-fitting  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.30 
 
lines, and the heights of the RT intercepts for the MR1 task versus the MR2 task 
for each of the two groups.  
We observed no effect of gender on any of the dependent variables. Thus, 
we pooled the data over this variable. Finally, none of the scores on the three 
questionnaires differed between participants assigned either to the fast or the slow 
VR groups.  
 
Effect of angle 
  Slow VR task group. In both mental rotation tasks, the angular disparity 
between  the  two  objects  affected  RTs,  as  revealed  by  one-way  repeated 
ANOVAs, with F(3, 33) = 57.55, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .84 for the MR1 task and F (3, 
33) = 47.93, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .82, for the MR2 task. As is evident in Figure 5, RTs 
increased linearly with the difference in angles between the two objects in the 
MR1 [F (1, 11) = 163.01, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .83] and the MR2 tasks [F (1, 11) = 
74.86, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .81]. The quadratic components of the angular disparity 
effect were significant in the MR1 task, F (1, 11) = 9.13, p < .025, ηp
2 = .22, and 
in the MR2 task, F (1, 11) = 6.96, p < .025, ηp
2 = .17. However, the proportion of 
variance explained by the linear trend was, respectively, 94.9% in the MR1 task 
and 95% in the MR2 task. Finally, replicating other studies of mental rotation, 
RTs were highly correlated with the magnitude of the difference in orientation of 
the two objects, with rs = .97, ps < .05 in both tasks (see Figure 5).  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.31 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
  Fast VR task group. In both mental rotation sessions, the angular disparity 
between  the  two  objects  affected  RTs,  as  revealed  by  one-way  repeated 
ANOVAs, with F (3, 33) = 50.42, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .82, for the MR1 task and F (3, 
33) = 40.78, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .79, for the MR2 task. As reported for the slow VR 
group, RTs increased linearly with increasing angles in the first set of MR trials, F 
(1, 11) = 141.62, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .81, and in the second set of MR trials, F (1, 11) 
=121.46, p < .0001, ηp
2 = .78. The trend analysis revealed a significant quadratic 
component in the MR1 task, F (1, 11) = 8.26, p < .025, ηp
2 = .20 but not in the 
MR2 task, F < 1, ηp
2 = .03. In addition, the linear trend accounted for 93.6% of 
the variance of the orientation effect in the first set of trials and 99.3% of the 
variance in the second set of trials. As shown in Figure 6, RTs were strongly 
correlated with angular disparity in both the MR1 task, r(2) = .97, p <.05, and the 
MR2 task, r(2) = .99, p < .01. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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ERs, slopes and intercepts 
  ERs. The ERs did not differ significantly between the MR1 task and the 
MR2 task, either in the slow VR task group, M = 18.4% versus M = 16.8%, t(11) 
< 1, d = .17,  or in the fast VR group, M = 15.8% versus M = 17%, t < 1, d = .11 
(see Table 2). In addition, a two-way ANOVA (MR task x VR groups) did not 
reveal an interaction between the type of VR task (i.e., slow versus fast) and the 
type of MR task (i.e., MR1 and MR2), F < 1, ηp
2 = .03. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Slopes.  We  again  failed  to  observe  an  interaction  between  the  VR 
condition and the MR tasks on the RTs, F (1, 22) = 1.34, p > .25, ηp
2 = .06. As in 
Experiment 1, we conducted a power analysis of the interaction between the VR 
conditions (i.e., slow vs. fast) and the MR tasks (i.e., MR1vs. MR2 tasks) on the 
slopes to estimate the risk of a type-II error. According to the tacit knowledge 
account, we would expect at least a moderate effect size for the interaction (e.g. η
2 
= .10, which is on the small side for an effect size). However, for α = .05, a 
sample of 24 participants, and a correlation of r(22) = .43 between the slopes in 
the MR1 and MR2 tasks, the probability of a type-II error is low (β = 4.7 %). In 
addition, the mental rotation rates were comparable before (M = 10.7 ms/degree  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.33 
 
in the slow VR task group and M = 11.2 ms/degree in the fast VR task group) and 
after (M = 11.4 ms/degree in the slow VR task group and M = 9.8 ms/degree in 
the fast VR task group) the visual rotation task, all ts < 1, ds < .24 (see Table 2).  
Moreover, in the slow VR task group, the rotation speed of the objects 
presented visually (22.2 ms/degree) was not within the 99% CI of the mental 
rotation rate observed in the MR2 task (CI = 8.1 ms/degree - 14.8 ms/degree). 
Similarly, in the fast VR task group, the rotation rate of the objects in the VR task 
(5.5 ms/degree) was outside the 99% CI of the speed of mental rotation in the 
MR2 task (CI = 6.7 ms/degree - 12.8 ms/degree).  
Finally, we compared the speed of mental rotation between the fast and 
the slow VR groups. We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the 
mental rotation rates in the MR2 task, with the rotation rates in the MR1 task as a 
covariate and the type of VR task as a fixed factor. As expected, there was no 
difference between the two groups in the speed of rotation in the second set of 
trials, F (1, 21) = 1.24, p > .25, ηp
2 = .06.  
  Intercepts. As in the two previous experiments, we considered the average 
RT in the 0 degree orientation as the height of the intercept (see Table 2). In the 
slow VR task group, the intercept was no higher in the MR2 task (M = 1767 ms) 
than in the MR1 task (M = 1390 ms), t(11) = 1.61, p > .10, d = .51. Similarly, in 
the fast VR task group, the heights of the intercepts did not differ between the  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.34 
 
MR1 task (M = 1735 ms) and the MR2 task (M = 1387 ms), t(11) = 1.05, p > .25, 
d = .39.  
  However, crucially, we did find evidence that the instructions were not 
simply ignored: We found an interaction on the intercepts between the VR group 
and the MR task, F(1, 22) = 4.48, p < .05, ηp
2 = .27. As shown in Figure 7, 
participants slowed down their responses after having seen the relatively slow 
perceptual display in the slow VR condition, and sped up their responses after 
having  seen  the  relatively  fast  perceptual  display  in  the  VR  condition.  This 
interaction suggested that participants regulated their responses in the second set 
of MR trials in an attempt to mimic what they had seen.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
  Even  though  participants  were  explicitly  instructed  to  mentally  rotate 
objects at the same rate that they saw objects rotating in the visual rotation task, 
the steepness of the slopes was comparable in the mental rotation task performed 
before and after the visual rotation task for both groups of participants. A lack of 
statistical power cannot account for our failure to find differences in the speed of 
mental  rotation  after  observing  rotating  three-dimensional  shapes.  First,  the  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.35 
 
difference in the steepness of the slopes did not exceed .25 standard deviations. 
Second, the probability of a type-II error in the analysis of the interaction between 
Task and VR groups on the slopes was less than 5%. Third, the lack of difference 
on  the  slopes  replicated  the  results  of  Experiment  1.  Finally,  there  was  no 
difference in the mental rotation speed between the VR slow group and the VR 
fast group in the MR2 task, when controlling for the speed of the rotation in the 
MR1  task  --  as  revealed  by  an  ANCOVA,  which  increases  the  power  of  the 
analysis. 
However, we did find that the intercept of these slopes was different for 
the two groups: For participants who had viewed quickly rotating objects, the 
height of the intercepts was lower in the MR2 task than it was for participants 
who viewed the slowly rotating objects. Thus, we are confident that participants 
did attempt to modify the speed of their responses.   
Although participants succeeded in delaying (in the slow VR task group) 
or speeding up (in the fast VR task group) their overall responses, participants 
were not able to alter the speed of rotation per se (as reflected in the slopes of the 
best-fitting lines). The speed with which participants mentally rotated the objects 
in their images was not affected by their knowledge of the world (i.e., the rotation 
speed of the visually presented objects); the participants were not able to use this 
knowledge to mimic what would happen when they imagined the corresponding 
situation (i.e., during the mental rotation task). Nevertheless, the effect on the  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.36 
 
intercept is important in part because it demonstrates that we had enough power to 
detect  effects.  Moreover,  it  shows  that  our  participants  were  in  fact  trying  to 
cooperate. Finally, it shows that the overall speed of responding can be altered at 
will,  but  the  perhaps  more  complex  mental  rotation  processes  are  not  easily 
modified. Overall, these results suggest that the rotational component of mental 
rotation cannot be easily modified or affected by task demands. 
 
General Discussion 
As suggested by Pylyshyn (1981, 2003, 2007), we treated tacit knowledge 
as the "null hypothesis" to explain the mental rotation effect. In Experiment 1, we 
used  realistic  sets  of  instructions  to  change  participants’  knowledge  and 
expectations. In Experiment 2, we presented objects visually rotating at different 
speeds to modify participants’ beliefs and knowledge of the way our novel stimuli 
behave in the real world. In no case did such knowledge affect the rate of mental 
rotation.  
These  results  taken  together  allow  us  to  argue  that,  in  general,  tacit 
knowledge and cognitive penetration are not pervasive factors that affect mental 
rotation  experiments.  And,  in  particular,  we  showed  that  these  factors  do  not 
provide the best explanation of the linear relationship between RTs and angular 
disparity that is consistently reported in the mental rotation literature (e.g., see 
Shepard  &  Cooper,  1982).  Instead,  the  linear  increase  in  RT  with  increasing  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.37 
 
angular disparity suggests that intermediate representations of the object need to 
be visualized in order to mentally rotate an object. One cannot easily imagine an 
object  in  one  orientation  simply  being  transposed  to  another  orientation  as 
opposed to what has been reported for image scanning processes (e.g., Kosslyn, 
1980).  
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that even the speed of mental 
rotation is not easily cognitively penetrable. Of course, we cannot rule out that the 
speed of rotation conceivably could be altered in some circumstances, but we 
have shown that it is not easily modified – as it should be if tacit knowledge were 
governing performance.  
In  short,  the  findings  in  the  two  experiments  reported  in  this  article 
suggest that the tacit knowledge account is not a plausible explanation for all 
imagery effects. Instead, at least some such effects apparently are constrained by 
the  intrinsic  nature  of  the  underlying  representations  and  processes  used  to 
perform the task.  In particular, the remarkable consistency of the rotation rate 
suggests  that  the  speed  of  rotation  is  constrained  by  characteristics  of  the 
underlying representations and processes that are used in mental rotation.   Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.38 
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Appendix 
Mental rotation instructions: 
“We have found that the most efficient way to perform this task is the 
following: When you see the two objects, please mentally rotate (in your mind's 
eye) the object on the right from its original position to a position where it is 
aligned  in  the  same  way  as  the  object  on  the  left.  Once  the  objects  are  in 
alignment, that is, once they are oriented in the same way, please make your 
judgment as to whether they are the same or different. It is important that, on each 
trial, you "see" the object on the right side of the screen rotating from its position 
on the screen into alignment with the object on the left side.” 
 
Leap instructions: 
  “We have found that the most efficient way to perform this task is the 
following: When you see the two objects, please imagine (in your mind's eye) that 
the  object  on  the  right  quickly  and  in  a  single  leap,  jumps  from  its  original 
position to a position where it is aligned in the same way as the object on the left. 
Once the objects are in alignment, that is, once they are oriented in the same way, 
please make your judgment as to whether they are the same or different. It is 
important that, on each trial, you "see" the object on the right side of the screen 
jumping quickly and in a single leap, without visualizing the intermediate steps  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.43 
 
(as if the transformation was instantaneous), from its position on the screen into 
alignment with the object on the left side.”  
 
Analytic instructions: 
  “We have found that the most efficient way to perform this task is by 
using  an  analytical  approach.  That  is,  in  order  to  accomplish  this  task  most 
quickly  and  accurately,  it  will  be  easiest  if  you  compare  the  segments  of  the 
object on the right with the segments of the object on the left, to decide whether 
they fit together in the same way without rotating any of the segments.” 
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Table 1. Experiment 1: Mean RTs for different orientations (ms), mean slopes of 
the best-fitting lines (ms/degree), mean ERs (%) and standard errors of the mean 
(SE) in the SM task and the CS task for different types of instructions. 
 
      Type of tasks 
      SM task  CS task 
      Angular disparity between objects (degree)      Orientation of the stimuli (degree)     
      0  50  100  150  Slopes  ERs  0  60  120  180  Slopes  ERs 
M  1516  2364  3098  3329  12.4  12.5  822  946  1122  1583  4.1  5.2 
MR  SE  128.19  165.63  186.86  182.25  1.17  2.27  31.58  39.42  41.49  94.30  0.48  0.89 
M  1407  2264  2816  3141  11.5  13.1  814  911  1043  1426  3.3  4.4 
Leap  SE  84.95  167.99  193.29  194.96  1.10  1.88  39.43  44.44  46.98  97.05  0.42  1.32 
M  1395  2323  2961  3315  12.8  11.8  924  1006  1235  1682  4.2  4.8 
Type of 
instruction  Analytic  SE  61.63  143.99  189.61  216.22  1.18  1.52  53.87  37.47  77.35  98.67  0.45  1.21 
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Table 2. Experiment 2: Mean RTs for different orientations (ms), mean slopes of 
the best-fitting lines (ms/degree), mean ERs (%) and standard errors of the mean 
(SE) in the MR1 and the MR2 tasks for different types of VR task. 
 
      Type of tasks 
      MR1 task  MR2  task 
      Angular disparity between objects (degree)      Angular disparity between objects (degree)     
      0  50  100  150  Slopes  ERs  0  50  100  150  Slopes  ERs 
M  1390  2145  2774  2963  10.7  18.4  1767  2573  3222  3452  11.4  16.8 
Slow  SE  128.61  203.55  229.07  251.29  1.10  3.02  267.92  283.09  276.17  283.99  1.32  3.74 
M  1666  2420  3143  3292  11.2  15.8  1497  2077  2564  2960  9.8  17.0  Type  
of VR 
task  Fast  SE  188.79  270.88  278.73  282.16  1.09  2.84  137.20  174.00  186.93  192.08  1.18  2.65 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example of a pair of three-dimensional objects with (a) identical and (b) 
different shapes with a 50° rotation of the object on the right used in the 
SM task. 
Figure 2. Example of a (a) standard and a (b) mirror-image character rotated by 
120°, used in the CS task.   
Figure  3.  Experiment  1.  RTs  for  different  angular  disparities  in  the  three-
dimensional shapes for the three groups of participants in the SM task. 
Figure 4. Experiment 1. RTs for different angular disparities of the character from 
its upright orientation for the three groups of participants in the CS task.  
Figure 5. Experiment 2. RTs for different angular disparities for the two mental 
rotation tasks (i.e., MR1 and MR2) for the slow VR task group. 
Figure 6. Experiment 2. RTs for different angular disparities for the two mental 
rotation tasks (i.e., MR1 and MR2) for the fast VR task group. 
Figure 7. Experiment 2. RTs for the intercepts for the two mental rotation tasks 
(MR1  and  MR2)  for  the  fast  and  slow  VR  task  groups.  Error  bars 
represent standard errors of the mean. 
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(a)          (b) 
Figure 1. Example of a pair of three-dimensional objects with (a) identical and (b) 
different shapes with a 50° rotation of the object on the right used in the SM task. 
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(a)           (b) 
Figure 2. Example of a (a) standard and a (b) mirror-image character rotated by 
120°, used in the CS task.  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.50 
 
 
 
 
Figure  3.  Experiment  1.  RTs  for  different  angular  disparities  in  the  three-
dimensional shapes for the three groups of participants in the SM task. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 1. RTs for different angular disparities of the character from 
its upright orientation for the three groups of participants in the CS task.   Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.52 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 2. RTs for different angular disparities for the two mental 
rotation tasks (i.e., MR1 and MR2) for the slow VR task group.  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.53 
 
 
Figure 6. Experiment 2. RTs for different angular disparities for the two mental 
rotation tasks (i.e., MR1 and MR2) for the fast VR task group.  Mental Rotation and Cognitive Penetration, p.54 
 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 2. RTs for the intercepts for the two mental rotation tasks 
(MR1  and  MR2)  for  the  fast  and  slow  VR  task  groups.  Error  bars  represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
  
 